Investments of any kind involve risk.  Please read our complete risk disclaimer and terms of use below by clicking HERE      
SUBSCRIBER ACCESS - THESIS 2014

Bookmark and Share      

HOME   || A/V Presentations || Trigger$ ||   Commentary   ||  Understanding Abstraction  ||    Meet Gordon   ||  Subscription Services || SUBSCRIBER ACCESS

JOHN RUBINO'S
LATEST BOOK
Read More
CHARLES HUGH SMITH'S
LATEST BOOK

Read More

NEW SERIES RELEASE

 

"DOW 20,000 "
Read the Series...

 

HELD OVER

Currency Wars

Euro Experiment

Sultans of Swap

Extend & Pretend

Preserve & Protect

Innovation

Showings Below
  

 

 

 


Bookmark and Share


 

"PRESERVE & PROTE

CT"
Read the series...

archives open
in a new window


PRESERVE & PROTECT:  The Jaws of Death

 

 

Fri. Oct. 9th, 2015

Follow Our Updates

onTWITTER

https://twitter.com/GordonTLong

AND FOR EVEN MORE TWITTER COVERAGE

https://twitter.com/sobata416

 

 

 

REPLAY

ANNUAL THESIS PAPERS

FREE (With Password)

THESIS 2010-Extended & Pretend
THESIS 2011-Currency Wars
THESIS 2012-Financial Repression
THESIS 2013-Statism
THESIS 2014-Globalization Trap
THESIS 2015-Fiduciary Failure

NEWS DEVELOPMENT UPDATES:
FINANCIAL REPRESSION
FIDUCIARY FAILURE

WHAT WE ARE RESEARCHING

2015 THEMES
SUB-PRIME ECONOMY
PENSION POVERITY
WAR ON CASH
ECHO BOOM
PRODUCTIVITY PARADOX
FLOWS - LIQUIDITY, CREDIT & DEBT
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE - COMING NWO

WHAT WE ARE WATCHING
(A) Active, (C) Closed

MATA
Q3 '15- Chinese Market Crash (A)
Q3 '15-

GMTP
Q3 '15- Greek Negotiations (A)
Q3 '15- Puerto Rico Bond Default

MMC

OUR STRATEGIC INVESTMENT INSIGHTS (SII)

NEGATIVE-US RETAIL
NEGATIVE-ENERGY SECTOR
NEGATIVE-YEN
NEGATIVE-EURYEN
NEGATIVE-MONOLINES
POSITIVE-US DOLLAR

         

ARCHIVES 

OCTOBER
S M T W T F S
        1 2 3
4 5 6 7 8 9 10
11 12 13 14 15 16 17
18 19 20 21 22 23 24
25 26 27 28 29 30 31

Today's Tipping Points Page
Complete Archives

KEY TO TIPPING POINTS

1- Bond Bubble
2 - Risk Reversal
3 - Geo-Political Event
4 - China Hard Landing
5 - Japan Debt Deflation Spiral
6- EU Banking Crisis
 
7- Sovereign Debt Crisis
8 - Shrinking Revenue Growth Rate
9 - Chronic Unemployment
10 - US Stock Market Valuations
11 - Global Governance Failure
12 - Chronic Global Fiscal ImBalances
13 - Growing Social Unrest
14 - Residential Real Estate - Phase II
15 - Commercial Real Estate
16 - Credit Contraction II
17- State & Local Government
18 - Slowing Retail & Consumer Sales
19 - US Reserve Currency
 
20 - US Dollar Weakness
21 - Financial Crisis Programs Expiration
22 - US Banking Crisis II
23 - China - Japan Regional Conflict
24 - Corruption
25 - Public Sentiment & Confidence
26 - Food Price Pressures
27 - Global Output Gap
28 - Pension - Entitlement Crisis
29 - Central & Eastern Europe
 
30 - Terrorist Event
31 - Pandemic / Epidemic
32 - Rising Inflation Pressures & Interest Pressures
33 - Resource Shortage
34 - Cyber Attack or Complexity Failure
35 - Corporate Bankruptcies
36 - Iran Nuclear Threat
37- Finance & Insurance Balance Sheet Write-Offs
38- Government Backstop Insurance
39 - Oil Price Pressures
40 - Natural Physical Disaster

 

Reading the right books?
No Time?

>> Click to Browse <<

We have analyzed & included
these in our latest research papers Macro Analytics videos!

OUR MACRO ANALYTIC

CO-HOSTS

John Rubino's Just Released Book

Charles Hugh Smith's Latest Books

 

 

Our Macro Watch Partner

Richard Duncan Latest Books

MACRO ANALYTIC

GUESTS

F William Engdahl

 

 

 

 

 

OTHERS OF NOTE


Book Review- Five Thumbs Up
for Steve Greenhut's Plunder!

 

 

 

pdf Download

 

Have your own site? Offer free content to your visitors with TRIGGER$ Public Edition!

Sell TRIGGER$ from your site and grow a monthly recurring income!

Contact goldenphi@triggers.ca for more information - (free ad space for participating affiliates).


HOTTEST TIPPING POINTS
   
Theme Groupings

We post throughout the day as we do our Investment Research for:

LONGWave - UnderTheLens - Macro Analytics

Scroll TWEETS for LATEST Analysis

 

 

"BEST OF THE WEEK "

MOST CRITICAL TIPPING POINT ARTICLES TODAY

 

   

 

 

FRIDAY FLOWS

Liquidity, Credit & Debt

 

10-09-15 THEMES

Something occurred in the banking system in September that required a massive reverse repo operation in order to force the largest ever Treasury collateral injection into the repo market.   Ordinarily the Fed might engage in routine reverse repos as a means of managing the Fed funds rate.   However, as you can see from the graph below, there have been sudden spikes up in the amount of reverse repos that tend to correspond the some kind of crisis – the obvious one being the de facto collapse of the financial system in 2008:

http://investmentresearchdynamics.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/REPO1.png

You can also see from this graph that the size of the “spike” occurrences in reverse repo operations has significantly increased since 2014 relative to the spike up in 2008. In fact, the latest two-week spike is by far the largest reverse repo operation on record.

Besides using repos to manage term banking reserves in order to target the Fed funds rate, reverse repos put Treasury collateral on to bank balance sheets.  We know that in 2008 there was a derivatives counter-party default melt-down.  This required the Fed to “inject” Treasury collateral into the banking system which could be used as margin collateral by banks or hedge funds/financial firms holding losing derivatives positions OR to “patch up” counter-party defaults (see AIG/Goldman).

What’s eerie about the pattern in the graph above is that since 2014, the “spike” occurrences have occurred more frequently and are much larger in size than the one in 2008.   This would suggest that whatever is imploding behind the scenes is far worse than what occurred in 2008.

What’s even more interesting is that the spike-up in reverse repos occurred at the same time – September 16 – that the stock market embarked on an 8-day cliff dive, with the S&P 500 falling 6% in that time period.  You’ll note that this is around the same time that a crash in Glencore stock and bonds began.   It has been suggested by analysts that a default on Glencore credit derivatives either by Glencore or by financial entities using derivatives to bet against that event would be analogous to the “Lehman moment” that triggered the 2008 collapse.

The blame on the general stock market plunge was cast on the Fed’s inability to raise interest rates.  However that seems to be nothing more than a clever cover story for something much more catastrophic which began to develop out sight in the general liquidity functions of the global banking system.

Without a doubt, the graphs above are telling us that something “broke” in the banking system which necessitated the biggest injection of Treasury collateral in history into the global banking system by the Fed.

MOST CRITICAL TIPPING POINT ARTICLES THIS WEEK - Oct 4th, 2015 - Oct 10th, 2015      
BOND BUBBLE     1
RISK REVERSAL - WOULD BE MARKED BY: Slowing Momentum, Weakening Earnings, Falling Estimates     2
GEO-POLITICAL EVENT     3
CHINA BUBBLE     4
JAPAN - DEBT DEFLATION     5

EU BANKING CRISIS

   

6

CREDIT CONTRACTION     16 - Credit Contraction II

 

GLENCORE TIMELINE

 

 

 

HEADLINE DETAILS & LINKS

respectively. Elsewhere, following a strategic leak over the weekend by the Telegraph that Glencore ... On a company specific basis, Glencore (+6.0%) lead Europe higher after talk that the Singapore ... While there is pressure on Glencore’s balance sheet given low commodity prices, the stress doesn’t mean ...

Story - Tyler Durden - 10/05/2015 - 06:54 - 20 comments - 0 attachments

After its biggest daily crash in history on concerns Glencore's (or Glenron as it has been called ... current price), which said it sees real economic value in both of Glencore’s businesses - clearly, hence ... is that "commodity trading" has not lost value at all, but it is Glencore's commodity trading that ...

Story - Tyler Durden - 09/29/2015 - 09:02 - 38 comments - 0 attachments

Back in July, long before anyone was looking at Glencore (or Asia's largest commodity trader, ... a rhetorical question: Which will be first: Trafigura, Mercuria or Glencore — zerohedge ... we have our answer: for now at least, Glencore, which is now flailing and which Bloomberg reported ...

Story - Tyler Durden - 09/29/2015 - 20:43 - 135 comments - 0 attachments

best...   And a little context for the Glencore Bounce is required...   ... *  *  * Early weakness overnight in US futures was suddenly well bid as Glencore bounced (in ...

Story - Tyler Durden - 09/29/2015 - 16:06 - 62 comments - 0 attachments

Now that after long last the market has turned its attention not only to Glencore's mining ... report . But before we get into it, here is a reminder of Glencore's most recent disclosed financial ... breakdown ofGlencore's "fair value" breakdown in Level 1 through 3 assets, which amount to $4 billion in ...

Story - Tyler Durden - 09/28/2015 - 09:28 - 60 comments - 0 attachments

AsiaPac in the early going. Noble Group (asia&#39;s Glencore) is crashing, down 6.7% at the open. FX ... Glencore, just as we warned... If you like GLEN CDS, you will love NOBLE http://t.co/itRvATiSFf ... worstGlencore since Noble: worst Glencore since Lehman     …  well, he is a famed   ...

Story - Tyler Durden - 09/28/2015 - 21:20 - 74 comments - 0 attachments

Glencore is in total free-fall across all markets today. Most worrying for systemic risk concerns ... exposures . Forthe first time since 2009, Glencore CDS are being quoted with upfront pricing (something ... (or 14% upfront) to buy protection against a Glencore default (which implies - given standard ...

Story - Tyler Durden - 09/28/2015 - 11:30 - 27 comments - 0 attachments

carnage in massive commodity group Glencore began to materialize. Glencore CDS is now above 700bps (up ... Cargill will own Glencore Cargill will own Glencore before this is all done............. Ah ...Glencore. It's a private Company and doesn't need to play the Wall Street games. OK but I&#039;ll ...

Story - Tyler Durden - 09/28/2015 - 08:23 - 23 comments - 0 attachmen

Update: And there it is: GLENCORE DEBT INSURANCE COSTS SURGE TO RECORD HIGH; 5-YR ... Switzerland-based Glencore which just two weeks ago unveiled an unprecedented " doomsday " capital raising and ... commodity prices drop 5%, or even stay where they are, then Glencore's investment grade rating - the most ...

Story - Tyler Durden - 09/28/2015 - 16:20 - 161 comments - 0 attachments

previously , following a surge in its Credit Default Swaps, the "doomsday" scenario for Glencore is now on the table, because the market suddenly realized that Glencore's most valuable asset, not its mines, or ... "commodity Lehman" scenario for Glencore, which much more than a simple copper miner just happens to be one ...

Story - Tyler Durden - 09/24/2015 - 23:54 - 138 comments - 0 attachment

Two weeks ago, in a stunning development, Glencore officially folded the towel on not only its ... current recession in commodity prices. As a result, Glencore CEO Ivan Glasenberg unveiled a $10 billion ... blow up currently in progress, tumbled from a level in the mid-400s to 300 bps on hopes Glencore would ...

Story - Tyler Durden - 09/22/2015 - 11:35 - 34 comments - 0 attachments

on Monday when Glencore's CEO Ivan Glasenberg - formerly a perpetual optimist in all things commodity ... for commodity prices. Glencore's unprecedented action was in direct response to an S&P ... 2.0x target, Glencore's CDS tumbled by nearly a third in the past 4 days. And then, something bad ...

Story - Tyler Durden - 09/11/2015 - 09:53 - 29 comments - 0 attachments

the end" for Glencore (which just days earlier Bank of America calculated would need a $12 billion ... step for Glencore would indeed be a collateral waterfall-inducing downgrade, one which would have sent ... changed: S&P: GLENCORE TO BBB/NEGATIVE FROM BBB/STABLE As a reminder, Glencore is the ...

Story - Tyler Durden - 09/07/2015 - 09:37 - 21 comments - 0 attachments

Update: even the rating agencies finally noticed - S&P: GLENCORE TO BBB/NEGATIVE ... Levered) Way To Play The Chinese Credit-Commodity Crunch ?" We were referring to Glencore credit ... Chinese/commodity crash as a result of Glencore massive exposure to the price of copper, which in its own words ...

Story - Tyler Durden - 09/02/2015 - 14:14 - 23 comments - 0 attachments

One month ago we asked: Which will be first: Trafigura, Mercuria or Glencore — ... Glencore may have top-ticked the commodity supercycle with its 2011 IPO, but it's been downhill ever since ... three months, substantially underperforming its peers Rio Tinto (which Glencore once tried to acquire) ...

Story - Tyler Durden - 08/19/2015 - 17:54 - 71 comments - 0 attachments

of what we said 17 months ago in an article laying out Glencore CDS as the best way to trade the ... Glencore has a huge $55 billion of debt, is drastically sensitive to copper (and other commodity) prices, and its CDS remains just off record tights .     Is Glencore the most ...

Story - Tyler Durden - 08/19/2015 - 17:38 - 12 comments - 0 attachment

Glencore, which last year concluded its merger with miner Xstrata creating the world's fourth largest mining ... weak pricing environment ," the company said. Glencore chief Ivan Glasenberg For ... months,Glencore is not only the dominant coal exporter in the global coal market, but one which has ...

Story - Tyler Durden - 11/14/2014 - 22:25 - 182 comments - 0 attachments

none other than Goldman Sachs (and Glencore) have simply incredible waiting times for delivery of the ...   Pacorini Metals is owned by commodity group Glencore Xstrata and Metro International Trade ... the LME will not entirely shock that none other than Goldman Sachs (and Glencore) have simply ...

Story - Tyler Durden - 05/12/2014 - 11:43 - 46 comments - 0 attachment

In what could be the biggest merger news of the year, Bloomberg reports that Glencore and Xstrata could be close to a merger: GLENCORE SAID TO BE NEAR AGREEMENT TO COMBINE WITH XSTRATAGLENCORE, XSTRATA MAY ANNOUNCE DEAL AS SOON AS THIS WEEK COMBINED XSTRATA, GLENCORE MAY BE WORTH $82 ...

Story - Tyler Durden - 02/01/2012 - 23:41 - 48 comments - 0 attachments

little uglier for the biggest IPO of 2011. In just its second day of trading, Glencore has already broken its IPO price. Reuters reports: &quot;Shares in commodities trading group Glencore fell below ... speculators and Glencore would have been the world's largest market cap company already.. Zero ...

Story - Tyler Durden - 05/20/2011 - 12:26 - 36 comments - 0 attachment

 

CREDIT CONTRACTION

Commodity Trading Giants Unleash Liquidity Scramble, Issue Record Amounts Of Secured Debt

Submitted by Tyler Durden on 10/06/2015 - 21:54

In a furious race to shore up as much liquidity as possible, Glencore - which a month ago announced a dramatic deleveraging plan - and its peers have been quietly scrambling to raise billions in secured funding. Case in point none other than Glencore's biggest competitor and the largest independent oil trader in the world, Swiss-based, Dutch-owned Vitol Group, whose Swiss unit Vitol SA earlier today raised a record $8 billion in loans.

Glencore Explains What Would Happen If It Is Downgraded To Junk

Submitted by Tyler Durden on 10/06/2015 - 15:43

"In the event of a downgrade by Standard & Poor’s and/or Moody’s from current ratings to the level(s) immediately below...  there are $4.5 billion of bonds outstanding, where a 125bps margin step-up would apply, in the event that the bonds were rated sub-investment grade by either major ratings agency."

    16 - Credit Contraction II

Submitted by Tyler Durden on 10/06/201

Commodity Trading Giants Unleash Liquidity Scramble, Issue Record Amounts Of Secured Debt

Earlier today, in its latest attempt to restore confidence in its brand and business model after suffering a historic stock price collapse, Glencore - whose CDS recently blew out to a level implying a 50% probability of default - released a 4 page funding worksheet which was meant to serve as a simplified summary of its balance sheet funding obligations and lending arrangements to equity research analysts who have never opened a bond indenture, and which among other things provided a simplified and watered-down estimate of what could happen if and when the company is downgraded to junk.

Meanwhile, in a furious race to shore up as much liquidity as possible, Glencore - which a month ago announced a dramatic deleveraging plan - and its peers have been quietly scrambling to raise billions in secured funding. Case in point none other than Glencore's biggest competitor and the largest independent oil trader in the world, Swiss-based, Dutch-owned Vitol Group, whose Swiss unit Vitol SA earlier today raised a record $8 billion in loans.

It is not alone.

As Bloomberg reports, another name profiled previously here, privately-held (but with publicly-traded debt) Trafigura  "won improved terms on a $2.2 billion loan refinancing deal on Oct. 1 via a group of 28 banks. Swiss commodity traders Gunvor Group Ltd. and Mercuria Energy Group Ltd. are also marketing credit facilities totaling $2 billion."

Louis Dreyfus Commodities, the world’s largest raw-cotton and rice trader, said in its interim report last month that it had six revolving credit facilities with staggered maturity dates totaling $3.3 billion. In June, it amended and extended its North American facilities totaling $1.6 billion and in July it refinanced a $400 million Asian lending facility with the company securing an option to request an increase of $100 million.

Noble Agri, the agricultural commodity trader majority owned by China’s Cofco Corp., attracted four new lenders to its $1.58 billion one-year revolving credit facility, people familiar with the matter said this month.

In short - a race against time to pledge as much unencumbered collateral as possible for future funding needs, because as every CEO knows you raise capital when you can, not when you have to. Yet this is odd, because even as the companies hold investor meetings and publicly comfort investors that they are adequatly funded and see no need for a liquidity-raising scramble, that's precisely what the world's commodity traders are doing.

Bloomberg's take was more optimistic: "The transactions show banks are still eager to loan money to commodity traders even after debt concerns caused by wild swings in Glencore’s stock and bond prices."

The new loans and refinancing signal banks are comfortable lending to commodity traders, whose business models allow them to profit from volatility and lower financing costs amid weaker prices for raw materials.

According to Bloomberg, Vitol’s record credit facilities from a group of 57 banks were increased by a third after the initial $6 billion sought by the trading house was oversubscribed by $2.7 billion, the Rotterdam-based company said in a statement. The facilities, refinancing a debt package signed 12 months ago, are the biggest in the firm’s 49-year history, a Vitol spokeswoman in London said.

Then comes even more spin:

The loan package, coming after Trafigura last week agreed to lower lending rates, suggests some analysts don’t understand the business of trading houses, which can benefit from lower commodity prices and the current contango market structure that allows them to profit by storing oil because forward prices are higher than current costs.

Actually analysts (at least credit) understand the business of trading houses very well; what Bloomberg's reporters don't seems to understand, however, is the principle of muturally assured megaleverage destruction, or the implied threat for a company's secured lending syndicate that a borrower which already has billions of exposure to banks has all the leverage in demanding even more debt. After all, should Vitol fail, it would lead to a cascade of bank failures as all the banks that have lent money to the giant commodity trader are forced to charge off their exposure, in the process leading to serial defaults among undercapitalized financial institutions.

It is these institutions whose credit officers underwrote the loans, that are the ones who "don't understand the business of trading houses" because based on the recent collapse in publicly traded securities, they never modelled what happens to cash flows in a world in which the price of oil, copper,  zinc, aluminum or other commodities, suffer a 50%+ plunge in prices.

“Given the recent turbulence in the commodities space, we have been repeatedly asked by investors on the banks’ exposure to commodity traders,” analysts at Sanford C. Bernstein led by Chirantan Barua wrote in a note Monday. 

As they well should, and in order to avoid answering, the banks are perfectly happy to throw a little more good money after lots of bad money in order to avoid remarking their entire exposure to the sector to something resembling fair value.

But the day of remarking is coming: as Bernstein calculates, commodity traders have raised at least $125 billion of debt, of which about $75 billion is loans. In other words, there is about $75 billion in secured debt, collateralized by either inventory and/or receivables collateral whose value has cratered in the past year, and as a result the LTV on the secured loans has soared. It is this that is prompting the panicked banks to be more eager to provide funds to the suddenly distressed energy-trading sector than even the borrowers themselves. And after all, if the banks do blow up, there is always the taxpayer-funded bailout as a last reserve.

And here is a pop quiz to either analyst, or Bloomberg writers who don't "understand the the business of trading houses" - if you issue secured debt to shore up liquidity as a result of what is fundamentally a massively overlevered capital structure, does the pro forma debt increase or decrease. This is not a trick question.

The good news for the Vitols of the world is that by pledging even more of their unencumbered assets to banks, they buy themselves a few more months, or quarters, of liquidity to pay down upcoming maturities and interest. Which is what Glencore did with its "doomsday" plan in early September... a plan which calmed the stock for all of two weeks before investors saw right through it for what it was: a desperate scramble to put lipstick on a declining-stage supercycle pig.

In the meantime, the end result is this: companies that are even more levered to commodity prices in a world in which at last check commodity prices, a proxy for China's economy, are sliding. Which, incidentally, was our thesis in March of 2014 when we said that buying Glencore CDS is the best way to trade China's hard landing. This is precisely what happened.

Which is why both the companies, and their lending banks, better pray that commodity prices pick up in the coming weeks and months, because for the Vitols, the Glencores, the Trafiguras, the Mercurias and so on, that is all that matters. Ironically, by levering up even more, they bought themselves some time now, but if and when the next leg down in the commodity supercycle takes place, the pain will only be that much greater.

 

Submitted by Tyler Durden on 10/06/2015 - 15:43

Glencore Explains What Would Happen If It Is Downgraded To Junk

As part of its ongoing scramble to defend itself against "speculators" and concerns about its balance sheet, earlier today Glencore released a 4 page "funding worksheet" detailing all of its obligations.

Among the highlights was Glencore's disclosure of total available liquidity as of this moment, which the firm reported to be materially above its June level of $10.5 billion:

At 30 June 2015, available committed liquidity was $10.5 billion (p. 71 of 2015 Half-Year Report). As of today, committed available liquidity is materially above June’s level, given the recent $2.5 billion equity placement, the business generating positive free cashflow and the ongoing focus on delivery of the various other debt reduction measures, including lower net working capital. Further delivery of the debt reduction programme, including the $2 billion target for asset disposals, will similarly enhance liquidity levels.

It also presented its sources of funding among which the well-known $31.1 billion in bonds, as well as $20 billion in short-term funding split between a $15.25 revolver (of which a "substantial portion" is undrawn), $1.2 billion in AR/Inventory secured funding, and $3.4 billion in bilateral bank facilities. Glencore was quick to point out the gullibility of its bank lenders: "No financial covenants, no rating events of default or rating prepayment events, no material adverse change events of default or material adverse change prepayment events."

Next Glencore details the terms of its notes and cross-guarantees which it lays out as follows:

$36.5 billion notes outstanding at 30 June 2015, including $1.9 billion maturing in October 2015. See Appendix for full details.

  • Notes are issued on a pari passu basis, applying a cross guarantee structure introduced at the time of the Xstrata acquisition (see Moody’s and S&P reports dated 7 May 2013 and 19 June 2013, respectively).
  • Glencore Group bonds (issued by Glencore Funding LLC, Glencore Finance (Europe) AG and Glencore Australia Holdings Pty Ltd) have guarantees from Glencore plc, Glencore International AG and Glencore (Schweiz) AG (previously Xstrata (Schweiz) AG).
  • Following the Xstrata acquisition, legacy Xstrata bonds (issued by Xstrata Finance (Canada) Limited, Xstrata Canada Financial Corp, Xstrata Canada Corporation and Xstrata Finance (Dubai) Limited) also now have guarantees from Glencore plc and Glencore International AG, implemented by way of supplemental indentures.
  • Similarly, the outstanding USD notes issued by Viterra Inc. in August 2010 have guarantees in place from Glencore plc and Glencore International AG.

Glencore also notes the $17.9 billion in Letter of Credit commitments it had outstanding as of June 30:

As part of Glencore’s ordinary sourcing and procurement of physical commodities and other ordinary marketing obligations, the selling party (or Glencore voluntarily) may request that a financial institution act as either a) the paying party upon the delivery of product and qualifying documents through the issuance of a letter of credit or b) the guarantor by way of issuing a bank guarantee accepting responsibility for Glencore’s contractual obligations.

The LC is not incremental exposure to that already reported in the financial statements. An LC is only a “contingent” obligation, disclosed as such in Glencore’s financial statements i.e. becomes a liability in the event that Glencore does not perform on an already recorded liability. The underlying transaction / procurement liability is recognised within “Trade Payables” in Glencore’s balance sheet. At 30 June 2015, $17.9 billion of such LC commitments have been issued on behalf of Glencore, with the respective liabilities reflected within the $28.1bn of recorded accounts payables. The contingent obligation settles simultaneously with the payment for such commodity. Availability is substantially higher, such that the vast majority of these Glencore facilities remain undrawn.

An interesting tangent is when Glencore discusses it readily marketable inventories:

Represents those marketing inventories that are contractually sold or hedged. At June 30 2015, total inventories were $23.6 billion, of which Marketing RMI were $17.7 billion.

For corporate leverage purposes Glencore accounts for RMI as being readily convertible to cash due to their very liquid nature, widely available markets and the fact that price exposure is covered by either a forward physical sale or hedge transaction.

Which brings up the very interesting question: with Glencore touting its revolver availability, and its various secured facilities, just how is Glencore marking the fair value of its inventories, because a ton of copper a year ago as collateral is worth just a little bit more than a ton of copper currently. We are confident Glencore's banks are aware of this.

But finally, and most importantly, Glencore presents what it believes would happen if it is downgraded from Investment Grade to Junk. This is what it says:

Glencore is undertaking measures to strengthen its balance sheet, including a material debt reduction, that the company expects shall serve to protect and maintain a strong BBB/Baa credit rating.

In the event of a downgrade by Standard & Poor’s and/or Moody’s from current ratings to the level(s) immediately below, a ratings’ grid in the $6.8 billion 5-year revolving credit facility provides for a modest additional margin step-up. As this 5-year revolving credit facility is expected to remain fully undrawn, the net additional effect would only be 35% of this modest step-up margin, being the applicable commitment fee only. The maximum margin for sub-investment grade rating from either Standard & Poor’s or Moody’s is 1.10%. There is no ratings grid in relation to the $8.45 billion revolving credit facility. In addition, there are $4.5 billion of bonds outstanding, where a 125bps margin step-up would apply, in the event that the bonds were rated sub-investment grade by either major ratings agency.

Which reminds us of the waterfall analysis being shared around in the weeks before the AIG downgrade unleashed a series of events that ultimately led to the insurance company's bail out. It too presented glowing picture of the potential risks. In the end it was very deficient. One can only hope that Glencore has learned the lesson of never misrepresenting the worst case scenario.

Full letter below (link)

Glencore Funding

Glencore Funding

 

TO TOP
MACRO News Items of Importance - This Week

GLOBAL MACRO REPORTS & ANALYSIS

     

US ECONOMIC REPORTS & ANALYSIS

     
CENTRAL BANKING MONETARY POLICIES, ACTIONS & ACTIVITIES      
     
Market Analytics
TECHNICALS & MARKET ANALYTICS

 

   
COMMODITY CORNER - AGRI-COMPLEX   PORTFOLIO  
SECURITY-SURVEILANCE COMPLEX   PORTFOLIO  
     
THESIS - Mondays Posts on Financial Repression & Posts on Thursday as Key Updates Occur
2015 - FIDUCIARY FAILURE 2015 THESIS 2015
2014 - GLOBALIZATION TRAP 2014

2013 - STATISM

2013-1H

2013-2H

2012 - FINANCIAL REPRESSION

2012

2013

2014

10-05-15 THESIS

 

FINANCIAL REPRESSION

 

2011 - BEGGAR-THY-NEIGHBOR -- CURRENCY WARS

2011

2012

2013

2014

2010 - EXTEND & PRETEND

   
THEMES - Normally a Thursday Themes Post & a Friday Flows Post
I - POLITICAL
     
CENTRAL PLANNING - SHIFTING ECONOMIC POWER - STATISM   THEME  

- - CORRUPTION & MALFEASANCE - MORAL DECAY - DESPERATION, SHORTAGES.

  THEME
- - SECURITY-SURVEILLANCE COMPLEX - STATISM M THEME  
- - CATALYSTS - FEAR (POLITICALLY) & GREED (FINANCIALLY) G THEME  
II-ECONOMIC
     
GLOBAL RISK      
- GLOBAL FINANCIAL IMBALANCE - FRAGILITY, COMPLEXITY & INSTABILITY G THEME  
- - SOCIAL UNREST - INEQUALITY & A BROKEN SOCIAL CONTRACT US THEME  
- - ECHO BOOM - PERIPHERAL PROBLEM M THEME  
- -GLOBAL GROWTH & JOBS CRISIS      
- - - PRODUCTIVITY PARADOX - NATURE OF WORK   THEME

MACRO ANALYTICS w/ CHS

- - - STANDARD OF LIVING - EMPLOYMENT CRISIS, SUB-PRIME ECONOMY US THEME
MACRO ANALYTICS w/ CHS
STANDARD OF LIVING - SUB-PRIME ECONOMY US THEME
MACRO ANALYTICS w/ CHS
Submitted by Tyler Durden on 10/07/2015

The Source Of The US Economy's Only Bright Spot: $1 Trillion In Car Loans

 

Moments ago, the Federal Reserve released the latest, August, data on consumer credit which rose by $16 billion in the month, below the $19.5 billion expected, consisting of a $4 billion increase in credit card debt, and $12 billion in non-revolving, or auto and student loans, which at a combined total of $2.55 trillion now account for 73% of total US consumer credit.

The combined total monthly increase was the lowest since February on the back of a slowdown in non-revolving debt, while the increase in revolving credit was the weakest since May.

And while the headline number was uninspiring, focusing on what has been the biggest source of consumer spending in recent years, namely auto and student loans reveals the following interest charts.

First, only one word can describe the chart of total non-revolving credit: parabolic.

Second, while it will come as no surprise to anyone that government student loans, which surpassed $1 trillion over 3 years ago, continue soaring...

and are now funded entirely by the government...

... it is auto loans where the real action is.

In fact, as the following chart shows, after langushing between $70 and $800 billion in the second half of the last decade, since Q2 2010 US auto loans have been on an absolute tear, and have increased by over 40% in the past five years alone, to just shy of $1 trillion as of June 30!

This means that as of this moment both auto and student loans are well above the $1 trillion mark. It also explains why as most other parts of the US economy continue to stagnate, the US auto sector remains the only bright spot in an otherwise dreary landscape.

The flipside, of course, is that once (or rather if) rates eventually rise, and banks start demanding higher interest payments for all new car loans which have become the only source of incremental buying power, that will be the day one can finally kiss the US auto golden age, propped by some $300 billion in debt (not to mention a couple of government bailouts to boot) in the past 5 years, goodbye.

III-FINANCIAL
     
FLOWS -FRIDAY FLOWS

MATA

RISK ON-OFF

THEME
CRACKUP BOOM - ASSET BUBBLE   THEME  
SHADOW BANKING - LIQUIDITY / CREDIT ENGINE M THEME  
GENERAL INTEREST

 

   
STRATEGIC INVESTMENT INSIGHTS - Weekend Coverage

 

RETAIL - CRE

 

 

  SII

 

US DOLLAR

 

 

  SII

 

YEN WEAKNESS

 

 

  SII

 

OIL WEAKNESS

 

 

  SII
TO TOP
 

 

Read More - OUR RESEARCH - Articles Below


Tipping Points Life Cycle - Explained
Click on image to enlarge
   
TO TOP

 

 YOUR SOURCE FOR THE LATEST
GLOBAL MACRO ANALYTIC

THINKING & RESEARCH

 

 
 
 
 
   TO TOP
  HOME    ||    Audio   ||  Commentary    ||   Understanding Abstraction   ||   Meet Gordon   ||   Subscriptions  
TERMS OF USE

Gordon T Long is not a registered advisor and does not give investment advice. His comments are an expression of opinion only and should not be construed in any manner whatsoever as recommendations to buy or sell a stock, option, future, bond, commodity or any other financial instrument at any time. Of course, he recommends that you consult with a qualified investment advisor, one licensed by appropriate regulatory agencies in your legal jurisdiction, before making any investment decisions, and barring that, we encourage you confirm the facts on your own before making important investment commitments.

THE CONTENT OF ALL MATERIALS:  SLIDE PRESENTATION AND THEIR ACCOMPANYING RECORDED AUDIO DISCUSSIONS, VIDEO PRESENTATIONS, NARRATED SLIDE PRESENTATIONS AND WEBZINES (hereinafter "The Media") ARE INTENDED FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY.

The Media is not a solicitation to trade or invest, and any analysis is the opinion of the author and is not to be used or relied upon as investment advice. Trading and investing  can involve substantial risk of loss. Past performance is no guarantee of future returns/results. Commentary is only the opinions of the authors and should not to be used for investment decisions. You must carefully examine the risks associated with investing of any sort and whether investment programs are suitable for you. You should never invest or consider investments without a complete set of disclosure documents, and should consider the risks prior to investing. The Media is not in any way a substitution for disclosure. Suitability of investing decisions rests solely with the investor. Your acknowledgement of this Disclosure and Terms of Use Statement is a condition of access to it.  Furthermore, any investments you may make are your sole responsibility. 

THERE IS RISK OF LOSS IN TRADING AND INVESTING OF ANY KIND. PAST PERFORMANCE IS NOT INDICATIVE OF FUTURE RESULTS.

Gordon emperically recommends that you consult with a qualified investment advisor, one licensed by appropriate regulatory agencies in your legal jurisdiction, before making any investment decisions, and barring that, he  encourages you confirm the facts on your own before making important investment commitments.
  

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Information herein was obtained from sources which Mr. Long believes reliable, but he does not guarantee its accuracy. None of the information, advertisements, website links, or any opinions expressed constitutes a solicitation of the purchase or sale of any securities or commodities.

Please note that Mr. Long may already have invested or may from time to time invest in securities that are discussed or otherwise covered on this website. Mr. Long does not intend to disclose the extent of any current holdings or future transactions with respect to any particular security. You should consider this possibility before investing in any security based upon statements and information contained in any report, post, comment or recommendation you receive from him.

 

FAIR USE NOTICE  This site contains copyrighted material the use of which has not always been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. We are making such material available in our efforts to advance understanding of environmental, political, human rights, economic, democracy, scientific, and social justice issues, etc. We believe this constitutes a 'fair use' of any such copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the US Copyright Law. In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, the material on this site is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes.

 

If you wish to use copyrighted material from this site for purposes of your own that go beyond 'fair use', you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.   

COPYRIGHT  © Copyright 2010-2011 Gordon T Long. The information herein was obtained from sources which Mr. Long believes reliable, but he does not guarantee its accuracy. None of the information, advertisements, website links, or any opinions expressed constitutes a solicitation of the purchase or sale of any securities or commodities. Please note that Mr. Long may already have invested or may from time to time invest in securities that are recommended or otherwise covered on this website. Mr. Long does not intend to disclose the extent of any current holdings or future transactions with respect to any particular security. You should consider this possibility before investing in any security based upon statements and information contained in any report, post, comment or recommendation you receive from him.